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WHEN THE POLICE GET THE LAW WRONG: 
HOW HEIEN V. NORTH CAROLINA FURTHER 
ERODES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Vivian M. Rivera∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
In the midst of nationwide anger and distrust in law enforcement 
following violent police confrontations around the country, the 
Supreme Court handed down a ruling in Heien v. North Carolina1 
that increases the potential for police overreaching and abuse.2 In the 
spring of 2009, two Hispanic males in North Carolina were pulled 
over by the police for driving with a broken taillight.3 North Carolina 
state law, however, required only a single working taillight, which 
the car in question had.4 After Nicholas Heien, the owner of the car, 
consented to a search of his car, Officer Matt Darisse found a 
sandwich bag containing cocaine.5 Charged with attempted drug 
trafficking, Heien moved to suppress the evidence seized from his 
car, asserting that the initial stop and search violated the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.6 
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, a significant 
constitutional question had surfaced: can a police officer’s 
reasonable mistake of law give rise to the reasonable suspicion 
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science,
May 2013, University of San Diego. I would like to sincerely thank Professor Laurie Levenson 
for her invaluable guidance and insight. I would also like to thank my mother, Vivian Panting, 
and sister, Isabel Rivera, for their endless love and support, without which my education would 
not have been possible. 
1. 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
2. Dahlia Lithwick, The Supreme Court Ignores the Lessons of Ferguson, SLATE (Dec. 16,
2014, 2:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/12/heien_v
_north_carolina_as_the_rest_of_the_country_worries_about_police_overreach.html. 
3. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534–35.
4. Id. at 534.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 535.
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necessary to uphold a seizure under the Fourth Amendment?7 The 
Court, in an 8-1 decision, answered in the affirmative.8 
The conclusion reached by the Court is of particular meaning 
and importance to police officers as well as minority communities 
who have lost confidence in government and law enforcement. The 
Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable 
searches and seizures by government officials.9 However, in 
assessing Fourth Amendment cases, the Court has struggled to strike 
a balance between an individual’s interest in maintaining his or her 
privacy and the government’s interest in law enforcement.10 It is this 
conflict that confronted the Court in Heien. 
Part II of this Comment presents the historical background of 
Fourth Amendment protections and, more notably, the cases that 
have weakened those protections. Part III discusses the factual 
background of Heien, while Part IV sets forth the reasoning the 
Court adopted in holding that a police officer can stop a car based on 
a mistaken understanding of the law without violating the Fourth 
Amendment. Part V examines the Court’s reasoning and includes a 
discussion on the opinion’s legal and practical significance. Part VI 
concludes that the Court’s approach should be abandoned because an 
officer’s mistake of law, no matter how reasonable, cannot justify a 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”11 As such, 
it protects citizens by barring law enforcement from conducting 
unreasonable searches and seizures and by suppressing evidence that 
is illegally obtained.12 Although probable cause was the initial 
standard necessary to conduct Fourth Amendment searches and 
seizures, the landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio13 established the 
objective reasonable suspicion standard, which allows a police 
7. Id. at 534.
8. Id. at 535–36.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535–36.
10. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 544–45 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535.
13. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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officer to objectively assess each situation based on the totality of the 
circumstances.14 By replacing the original probable cause standard 
with reasonable suspicion, the Terry decision significantly 
diminished the scope of protection afforded to individuals under the 
Fourth Amendment.15 In a dissenting opinion in Terry, Justice 
William Douglas warned that “to give the police greater power than 
a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path.”16 
The Court should have heeded the warning by Justice Douglas; 
instead, the decision in Heien solidifies the Court’s trend of 
eviscerating our Fourth Amendment rights.17 For example, in 
Devenpeck v. Alford,18 the Court held that a warrantless arrest is 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment as long as probable cause 
exists for any offense at the time of the arrest.19 In Maryland 
v. Pringle,20 the Court held that when drugs are found in a car, all
occupants may be arrested even without particularized evidence
connecting them to the drug.21 In Illinois v. Wardlow,22 the Court
found that an individual who suddenly and without provocation flees
from identifiable police officers patrolling a high crime area creates
reasonable suspicion for the police to stop him or her.23
More recently, in Navarette v. California,24 the Court held that a 
police stop based on an anonymous tip does not amount to an 
unreasonable search or seizure, even if the arresting officer did not 
observe the vehicle speeding or swerving on the highway.25 Justice 
Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority in Navarette, explained 
that under the totality of the circumstances, the indicia of reliability 
from a 911 call is sufficient to provide an officer with the reasonable 
suspicion needed under the Fourth Amendment.26 Instead of heeding 
the warning by Justice Douglas, the Court handed police officers 
14. Id. at 21−22.
15. See id. at 38–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 38.
17. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
18. 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
19. Id. at 147.
20. 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
21. Id. at 366.
22. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
23. Id. at 125.
24. 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
25. Id. at 1686.
26. Id.
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overwhelming police power by serving up “a freedom-destroying 
cocktail.”27 The foregoing cases demonstrate a trend in favor of 
empowering law enforcement while undermining personal liberty.28 
As a result of these cases, the reasonable suspicion standard 
allows police officers to stop cars or detain people based on a lesser 
showing of a minimal level of objective justification.29 Under this 
standard, the Fourth Amendment gives law enforcement officers the 
flexibility to enforce the law to protect their communities.30 
Accordingly, the Court has held that searches and seizures based on a 
police officer’s reasonable misunderstanding of the facts are 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment.31 However, until Heien, 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence contained “scarcely a peep” about 
a police officer’s reasonable mistake of law.32 By adding an officer’s 
understanding of the law to the reasonableness inquiry of the Fourth 
Amendment, the majority in Heien adds “yet another layer of 
ambiguity about the boundaries” on police authority that tips in favor 
of the government.33 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the morning of April 29, 2009, Nicholas Heien and Maynor 
Javier Vasquez were driving down an interstate in Surry County, 
North Carolina.34 Officer Matt Darisse of the Surry County Sherriff’s 
Department was observing traffic on that interstate in order to “look 
for criminal indicators” of drivers and passengers.35 He observed 
Heien’s car and began to follow it on the interstate.36 According to 
Officer Darisse, Vasquez’s “criminal indicators” were that he looked 
very “stiff and nervous” since he was “gripping the steering wheel at 
a 10 and 2 position, looking straight ahead.”37 After noticing that the 
car only had one working taillight, Officer Darisse pulled the car 
27. Id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 544–45 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
29. Brittanee Friedman, Evidence Seized Based on Reasonable Police Mistake of Law Held
Admissible in North Carolina Court, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 249, 251 (2014). 
30. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536.
31. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–86 (1990).
32. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
33. Lithwick, supra note 2.
34. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
35. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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over, mistakenly believing that state law required two working 
taillights.38 The relevant provision of the North Carolina vehicle code 
provides that a car must be: 
[E]quipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the
vehicle. The stop lamp shall display a red or amber
light visible from a distance of not less than 100 feet
to the rear in normal sunlight, and shall be actuated
upon application of the service (foot) brake. The stop
lamp may be incorporated into a unit with one or
more other rear lamps.39
Officer Darisse gave the driver a warning ticket for the broken 
light but then became suspicious during the course of the stop 
because “Vasquez appeared nervous, Heien remained lying down the 
entire time, and the two gave inconsistent answers about their 
destination.”40 Officer Darisse asked whether he could search the car, 
and Heien, who had been asleep in the backseat while Vasquez 
drove, consented to the search.41 After the police officer found a 
sandwich bag containing cocaine, he arrested both men, and Heien 
was charged with attempted trafficking of cocaine.42 
Thereafter, Heien moved to suppress the evidence seized from 
the car, arguing that the stop and search violated the Fourth 
Amendment.43 The trial court denied his motion, finding that the 
faulty taillight had given Officer Darisse “reasonable suspicion to 
initiate the stop” and the subsequent search was valid.44 On appeal, 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the initial 
stop was invalid since driving with one working taillight was not a 
violation of North Carolina law.45 Thus, the stop violated the Fourth 
Amendment because the justification for the stop was “objectively 
unreasonable.”46 After the state appealed, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the stop was valid since the 
officer’s mistaken understanding of the vehicle code was 
38. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534.
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-129(g) (2007).
40. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 534–35.
43. Id. at 535.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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reasonable.47 The Court agreed to hear the case after Heien 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari.48 
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
On review before the Court, Heien argued that the traffic stop of 
his car, based solely on the police officer’s misinterpretation of local 
traffic law, violated the Fourth Amendment.49 He claimed that the 
objective inquiry of the Fourth Amendment “can be performed only 
by measuring the facts against the correct interpretation of the 
law.”50 One of the cases upon which Heien relied was Hill v. 
California,51 which held that an arrest based on mistake of fact was 
valid because the officers’ actions were “a reasonable response to the 
situation facing them at the time.”52 Based on Hill, Heien asserted 
that while the Fourth Amendment affords officers flexibility when it 
comes to factual determinations, there is no basis under the Fourth 
Amendment for treating mistakes of law the same as mistakes of 
fact.53 
The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, disagreed with Heien 
and held that a traffic stop based on a police officer’s mistaken 
understanding of the law did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because the mistake was reasonable.54 Chief Justice John Roberts, 
writing for the majority, explained that searches and seizures based 
on a police officer’s reasonable misunderstanding of the facts had 
long been permissible under the Fourth Amendment and therefore, 
mistakes of law should be afforded the same treatment.55 To 
illustrate this concept, he described a situation in which a motorist is 
pulled over for “traveling alone in a high-occupancy vehicle lane, 
only to discover upon approaching the car that two children are 
slumped over asleep in the back seat.”56 According to the Chief 
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 8.
50. Id.
51. 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
52. Id. at 804–05.
53. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 20.
54. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014).
55. Id. at 536.
56. Id. at 534.
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Justice, the driver in that scenario had not violated the law and the 
officer had not violated the Fourth Amendment.57 
The Court applied this line of reasoning to reach the conclusion 
in Heien, explaining that there was “no reason, under the text of the 
Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why this same result should 
be acceptable when reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, 
but not reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law.”58 
In support of its argument, the Court first looked to its decision in 
United States v. Riddle.59 In Riddle, a customs officer seized goods 
on the ground that the shipper had violated the customs laws by 
preparing an invoice that undervalued the merchandise, even though 
the American consignee declared the true value to the customs 
collector.60 The Riddle Court found no violation of the customs law 
because the consignee had not actually attempted to defraud the 
government.61 
Although the Court in Riddle was not interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment, Chief Justice Roberts explained that the concept of 
probable cause “has a fixed and well-known meaning.”62 In other 
words, Riddle illustrates the idea that probable cause encompasses 
suspicion based on reasonable mistakes of both fact and law.63 
Next, the Court looked to Michigan v. DeFillippo,64 where it 
held that an officer had probable cause to support an arrest even 
though the ordinance that had allegedly been violated was later held 
to be unconstitutional.65 The Chief Justice argued that probable cause 
involved suspicion based on reasonable mistakes of both fact and law 
because “the contrary conclusion would be hard to reconcile” with 
DeFillippo.66 
Moreover, the Court found “little difficulty concluding that the 
officer’s error of law was reasonable” after determining that the 
North Carolina statute governing “stop lamps” or brake lights 
57. Id.
58. Id. at 536.
59. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 311 (1809).
60. Id. at 311–12.
61. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 537.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
65. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 538 (quoting DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37–38).
66. Id. at 538.
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contemplated many different types of arrangements.67 The statute at 
issue referred to “a stop lamp” in the singular, but also provided that 
a “stop lamp may be incorporated into a unit with one or more other 
rear lamps.”68 Relying on the ambiguously worded statute, the Court 
concluded that it was “objectively reasonable” for the officer to 
believe that one malfunctioning brake lamp on a suspicious vehicle 
violated the statute.69 Consequently, the Court held that there was 
reasonable suspicion justifying the stop and affirmed the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina.70 
V. ANALYSIS
In sum, Heien holds that a police officer’s reasonable mistake of 
law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a 
stop under the Fourth Amendment.71 Such a holding in Heien 
represents more than a mere application of facts to judicial 
precedent. Rather, it solidifies the Court’s trend of eroding our 
Fourth Amendment protections and giving more power to law 
enforcement by allowing police officers to change the terms of the 
law.72 Accordingly, the Court’s approach represents a misapplication 
of the reasonableness doctrine and undercuts the principles set forth 
by the Fourth Amendment. 
A. The Reasonable Mistake of Law Doctrine Undermines the
Principles of the Fourth Amendment 
The objective of the Fourth Amendment is to protect citizens 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.73 Due to the strong interest 
of protecting individual privacy, police officers must have at least 
articulable and reasonable suspicion when stopping an automobile 
and detaining the driver.74 In Whren v. United States,75 the Court 
unanimously reaffirmed the objective nature of the reasonable 
suspicion standard, holding that an officer’s subjective motivations 
67. Id. at 540.
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-129(g) (2007).
69. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 532.
72. See id. at 544–45 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535–36.
74. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
75. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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for conducting a traffic stop are irrelevant to its legality.76 Thus, the 
reasonable suspicion standard involves a two-part inquiry: “the first 
part of the analysis involves only a determination of historical 
facts.”77 The next step is “whether the rule of law as applied to the 
established facts is or is not violated.”78 
The first step of the analysis in Heien reveals that Officer 
Darisse pulled Heien and his passenger over for driving a car with 
one broken taillight, mistakenly believing that state law required two 
working taillights.79 The second step of the analysis reveals that the 
rule of law, the North Carolina law governing vehicle codes, as 
applied to the established facts, was not violated.80 But the analysis 
did not stop there for the Court in Heien. Instead, the Court added to 
the inquiry by asking whether a reasonable police officer might have 
made the same mistake of law that Officer Darisse did.81 By 
answering this question in the affirmative, the Court measured the 
facts of individualized suspicion against a police officer’s reasonable 
but mistaken interpretation of the law.82 
1. Important Distinctions Between Mistakes of Fact
and Mistakes of Law 
With this policy in mind, the Court’s opinion undermines the 
principles that the Fourth Amendment sets forth and ignores the 
cases that frame the reasonableness inquiry around factual 
determinations.83 Instead, the Court relied on founding-era customs 
statutes and cases interpreting those statutes but conceded that the 
cases “are not directly on point” because they say nothing about the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment.84 
Next, relying on DeFillippo, the Court concluded that 
reasonable suspicion involves reasonable mistakes of both fact and 
law.85 However, the Court’s reliance on DeFillippo is misplaced 
76. Id. at 813.
77. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 13 (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696).
78. Id. (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1983)).
79. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534–35.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 536–37.
82. Id.
83. E.g., Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971) (holding that an arrest based on a
police officer’s mistake of fact was valid under the Fourth Amendment). 
84. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 537.
85. Id. at 539.
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because DeFillippo involved neither a police officer’s mistake of fact 
nor law.86 Instead, it involved a police officer correctly applying a 
then-existing law that was later found to be unconstitutional.87 By 
contrast, in Heien, no law ever actually criminalized Heien’s 
conduct, meaning the police officer stopped Heien on suspicion of 
committing a crime that never actually existed.88 Accordingly, the 
Court ignored well-established precedent indicating that reasonable 
suspicion requires courts to measure the facts against the correct 
interpretation of the law. 
In its reply brief, North Carolina argued that the justification for 
tolerating reasonable mistakes applies equally to mistakes of law 
because officers should not be expected to be “legal technicians.”89 
According to the state, officers in the field may have great difficulty 
interpreting complex state laws and should be afforded the flexibility 
to make those determinations.90 Moreover, the Chief Justice claimed 
that a police officer’s mistake of law should not be treated any 
differently under the Fourth Amendment because searches and 
seizures based on an officer’s reasonable misunderstanding of the 
facts had long been permissible.91 
The Chief Justice’s position overlooks the important doctrinal 
and practical differences between mistakes of law and fact. Although 
it is true that police officers are afforded broad leeway under the 
Fourth Amendment to make factual assessments, the reasons for 
condoning mistakes of fact under the reasonable suspicion standard 
do not apply to mistakes of law. Police officers are afforded leeway 
in making factual determinations because “police officers operating 
in the field have to make quick decisions” and have the expertise to 
“draw inferences and make deductions . . . that might well elude an 
untrained person.”92 Thus, they are presumed to be experts in 
formulating such judgments.93 But when it comes to the legal 
determinations, “it is courts, not officers, that are in the best position 
86. Id. at 546 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Brief for the Respondent at 14–15, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No.
13-604).
90. Id. at 15.
91. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539.
92. Id. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418
(1981)). 
93. Id.
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to interpret the laws.”94 Moreover, the meaning of a criminal statute 
does not change depending on the facts to which it is applied.95 
While police officers may reasonably draw different inferences in 
various factual situations, officers must apply the same 
understanding of the law to the facts they encounter.96 
2. The Mistake of Law Doctrine Undermines the Balancing
Test of the Fourth Amendment 
Furthermore, the Court’s adoption of the reasonable mistake of 
law doctrine undermines the balancing test of the Fourth 
Amendment.97 Whether a particular type of search is considered 
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment is determined by 
balancing two important interests: the intrusion on an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment rights and the legitimate government interests 
such as public safety.98 Taking these two interests into account, the 
emphasis placed by the Court on the reasonable mistake of law 
doctrine undermines the Fourth Amendment’s underlying rationale 
of protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures by the 
government. 
The Heien Court failed to consider that, in order to promote the 
aims of the Fourth Amendment, it benefits both the government and 
the citizenry to encourage police officers to learn the law they are 
entrusted to enforce.99 First, police officers’ ability to affect seizures 
based on a reasonable view of the facts attached to the correct 
interpretation of the law promotes efficiency and accuracy.100 
Presumably, a police officer is in the best position to make factual 
determinations necessary to resolve an issue out in the field.101 
However, giving police officers the ability to stop a car and detain 
the occupants based on a police officer’s mistaken interpretation of 
the law only serves to distort police authority.102 Assuring that police 
94. Id.
95. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 17.
96. Id.
97. See Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1140 (2012). 
98. Id.
99. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 35.
100. Id.
101. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 543 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
102. Id.; see also Lithwick, supra note 2 (emphasizing the overreaching latitude and
discretion afforded to police officers). 
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officers affect seizures based on a reasonable view of the facts 
against the correct interpretation of the law promotes efficiency and 
accuracy among law enforcement agencies.103 
Second, a police officer’s ability to make factual determinations 
and measure them against the correct interpretation of the law 
strengthens the public’s confidence in law enforcement, particularly 
now when that confidence is at an all-time low.104 By adding a police 
officer’s interpretation of the law to the reasonableness inquiry, 
Heien may advance the belief that police officers are not held to the 
same standard as members of the general public.105 In a lone dissent, 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor echoed this sentiment by stating, “[o]ne 
wonders how a citizen seeking to be law-abiding and to structure his 
or her behavior to avoid these invasive, frightening, and humiliating 
encounters could do so.”106 An officer’s ability to attach a reasonable 
legal misinterpretation that suggests a law has been violated to his or 
her view of the facts significantly reinforces the public’s perception 
of law enforcement as a corrupt institution.107 
In response to these concerns, the state asserted that the police 
officer’s mistake of law was not a subjective mistake but rather an 
objectively reasonable one.108 Under the totality of the 
circumstances, an objectively reasonable officer would have 
considered that same conduct—driving with one broken taillight—as 
a violation of state law just like Officer Darisse did.109 Thus, it is not 
the police officer’s interpretation of the law that plays a role in the 
reasonable suspicion analysis but rather whether a reasonable police 
officer in that position might have made the same mistake.110 The 
Court further justified this position by asserting that the Fourth 
Amendment allows for some mistakes on behalf of police officers 
103. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 35.
104. See Seth Morris, Supreme Court’s Police Debacle: How It Quietly Helped Cops Prey on
Poor People, SALON (Jan. 20, 2015, 7:41 AM) http://www.salon.com/2015/01/20/supreme_court 
_is_clueless_about_cops_how_they_help_police_prey_on_poor_people/. 
105. See id.
106. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 544–45; see also Morris, supra note 104 (arguing that because the Supreme
Court held that pretextual stops are permissible, and because technical requirements of the vehicle 
code ensure that police will have a reason to pull people over, poor people can only protect 
themselves from harassment by complying with the vehicle code). 
108. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 89, at 16.
109. See id. at 11.
110. Id.
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because “[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect.”111 Thus, the limit 
under the Fourth Amendment is that the “mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men.”112 
However, the reasonable suspicion standard involves only a 
two-part test: the first element focuses on determining the facts 
known to the officer, and the second element involves weighing the 
facts against the pertinent legal standard.113 Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence makes clear that the legal standard against which the 
facts and circumstances of a case are judged does not depend upon 
what a police officer knew or what a reasonable police officer would 
interpret the law to be.114 By giving police officers the ability to 
incorrectly interpret the law, the Court weakens the rule of law, 
which is at the core of our criminal justice system.115 
Rather than incentivizing and promoting government efficiency 
and social interest, the majority encourages police ignorance of the 
law and further erodes public confidence in government and law 
enforcement.116 Allowing those entrusted with enforcing the law to 
restrain an individual’s liberty based on incorrect legal assumptions 
is inconsistent with the principles of the Constitution.117 As a result 
of Heien, individuals who find themselves in a position akin to Heien 
will be “made to shoulder the burden of being seized whenever the 
law may be susceptible to an interpretive question.”118 Thus, a 
mistaken interpretation of the law, no matter how objectively 
reasonable, cannot serve as part of the totality of the circumstances 
justifying reasonable suspicion.119 In sum, it is this predicament in 
which a police officer is allowed to change the terms of the law that 
warrants the abandonment of the reasonable mistake of law doctrine 
in a Fourth Amendment analysis. 
111. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536.
112. Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
113. Brief for the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 7, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604). 
114. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996); see also Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (“It is not disputed that the Constitution permits an officer to arrest a 
suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is 
committing an offense.”). 
115. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
116. See Morris, supra note 104.
117. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543–44 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 546.
119. See id. at 547.
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B. The Mistake of Law Doctrine Is Relevant Only to the Issue of
Remedy Under the Fourth Amendment
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence also makes clear that the
question of whether there has been a Fourth Amendment violation 
and the question of whether, if so, the evidence obtained should be 
suppressed are “separate, analytically distinct issues.”120 The 
potential outcomes in Heien’s case included suppression of the 
cocaine evidence seized from his car by way of the exclusionary rule 
and application of the good faith exception where the evidence 
would be admitted despite the unlawfulness of the stop.121 The 
exclusionary rule provides that material obtained in violation of the 
Constitution cannot be introduced at trial against a criminal 
defendant.122 Accordingly, the purpose of the rule is to deter police 
misconduct and future Fourth Amendment violations.123 
The Court imposed substantial limits on the application of the 
exclusionary rule in its decision in Herring v. United States.124 In 
Herring, the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to 
negligent or good faith violations of the Fourth Amendment.125 
Similarly, in Davis v. United States,126 the Court found that 
suppression of evidence was inappropriate when officers conducted a 
search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding, but erroneous, 
appellate precedent.127 In Davis, the Court concluded that although 
the officer’s stop was reasonable because a reasonable officer would 
have made the same stop, it was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment because of a subsequent Court decision that made the 
search unconstitutional.128 
Notably in Heien, however, the issue before the Court had no 
bearing on potential remedies for a Fourth Amendment violation.129 
Instead, the Court only had to decide whether the police officer’s 
120. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 23 (citing Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419,
2431 (2011)). 
121. See id. at 23–25.
122. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 373 (2d ed.
2013). 
123. Id. at 373–74.
124. 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
125. Id. at 137.
126. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
127. Id. at 2423–24.
128. Id. at 2434.
129. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014).
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stop was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.130 Heien argued 
that the reasonableness of an officer’s mistake of law could only bear 
on whether to suppress evidence at the remedy stage.131 As such, the 
good-faith nature of the officer’s mistake could not render the search 
or seizure reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.132 According to 
Heien, confining the relevance of an officer’s mistake of law to the 
remedy stage safeguarded respect for the rule of law.133 
In response, the state argued that the objective reasonableness of 
a mistake of law is not relevant only to the issue of remedy because 
the reasonableness of mistaken facts sometimes determines whether 
the Fourth Amendment was violated.134 Thus, according to the state, 
“[t]he reasonableness of mistakes of law can likewise bear on both 
issues.”135 
The Court ultimately rejected Heien’s argument and by doing 
so, ignored Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that draws a sharp 
“‘distinct[ion]’ between the existence of a Fourth Amendment 
violation and the remedy for that violation.”136 Instead, the Court 
blended the issues of rights and remedies by finding that a reasonable 
mistake of law can bear on both issues.137 Moreover, the Court’s 
holding in Heien is difficult to reconcile with Davis, given that the 
search in Davis violated the Fourth Amendment when the law at the 
time allowed the search.138 These cases indicate that a mistake of law 
is relevant only to the issue of remedy. Thus, the Court erred by 
considering a reasonable mistake of law in addressing the question of 
whether there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
C. The Legal and Practical Significance of Heien
The foundation of the American legal system rests on the 
“notion that the law is definite and knowable.”139 With this policy in 
130. Id.
131. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 23.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 34.
134. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 89, at 26.
135. Id.
136. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 545 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2011)). 
137. See id. at 539.
138. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2431.
139. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498
U.S. 192, 199 (1991)). 
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mind, a reader can see that the Court’s opinion undermines the 
protections that the Fourth Amendment sets forth.140 In Heien, the 
Court held that a search based on a misunderstanding of the law is 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment as long as the police 
officer’s misinterpretation of the law was reasonable.141 But the 
Court’s holding raises an important question of how much law a 
reasonable police officer should know.142 The Court explained that 
the standard is whether it is “objectively reasonable for an officer in 
Sergeant Darisse’s position to think that” the conduct violated the 
law.143 However, this standard is vague and leaves reasonableness 
undefined.144 Rather than establishing a clear precedent on 
reasonable mistakes of law, the Court’s decision “only presages the 
likely difficulty that courts will have applying the Court’s decision in 
this case.”145 
The Court’s decision presents further problems because the 
Court is essentially allowing the government to defend an officer’s 
mistaken legal interpretation on the ground that the officer was 
unaware of the law or misunderstood it.146 Justice Elena Kagan tried 
to minimize the ruling in a concurring opinion by suggesting that it 
would apply only when a police officer was enforcing a “genuinely 
ambiguous” statute.147 As such, only mistakes of law based on “very 
hard questions of statutory interpretation” should be considered 
reasonable.148 
According to Justice Kagan, “such cases will be exceedingly 
rare,” and thus, the Heien decision does not encourage police 
ignorance of the law.149 However, more than twenty million 
Americans were stopped by law enforcement officers while driving 
in 2011.150 Thus, the potential for police abuse following the Court’s 
decision in Heien can hardly be considered “exceedingly rare.” 
Justice Kagan’s attempt to narrow the Court’s vague objectively 
140. See id. at 543–45.
141. Id. at 534 (majority opinion).
142. See id. at 547 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 540 (majority opinion).
144. See id. at 547 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Brief for the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et. al, supra note 113, at 14.
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reasonable standard fails to appreciate its application in the field, 
where police already have too much power at the hand of a badge 
and a gun.151 Moreover, the fact that mistakes of law will be 
“exceedingly rare” does not make the principle the Court established 
right. 
The Court’s decision also undermines the underlying rationale 
of the Fourth Amendment by encouraging police ignorance and 
creative interpretations of the law.152 The Court instead should have 
emphasized the importance of legal training to further the deterrent 
goal set forth by the exclusionary rule and the principles set forth by 
the Fourth Amendment.153 By condoning an officer’s mistake of law, 
the Court fosters citizen distrust of the police by insisting that the 
public adhere to the laws it permits the police to misinterpret.154 
Although an expectation of perfection in police understanding of 
the law is unrealistic, police officers are capable of understanding the 
law and adapting to any changes.155 Moreover, police officers are 
entrusted with the great responsibility to protect the public and 
enforce the law.156 As such, police officers should be held to the 
same standard as the public, and the government should not be able 
to impose criminal liability on an individual based on a police 
officer’s mistaken understanding of the law.157 
The Court’s decision in Heien presents further implications 
when applied to the criminal justice system as a whole.158 As the 
Court’s first and only Hispanic justice,159 Justice Sotomayor was the 
only justice to raise the troubling issue of race lurking in the 
151. See Morris, supra note 104.
152. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543–44 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
153. See CHEMERINSKY & LEVENSON, supra note 122, at 373–74; see also United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (holding that the exclusionary rule is a “judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment” protections through its deterrence effect).
154. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543–44 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Morris, supra note
104 (suggesting that the Supreme Court seems to still think that the police use the vehicle code 
solely to keep the roads safe, when in fact it is used as an excuse to pull people over for other 
reasons). 
155. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 38–39.
156. See id. at 36–38.
157. See id. at 38; see also Lithwick, supra note 2 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s
decision creates a double standard for the police since ignorance of the law is never an excuse for 
lay citizens). 
158. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
159. Profile: Sonia Sotomayor, BBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/8068637.stm. 
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background of the case.160 Heien and Vasquez, both Hispanic males, 
were pulled over and extensively searched based on the “criminal 
indicators” of driving “at a 10 and 2 position, looking straight 
ahead.”161 Even if the police officers did have a legitimate reason to 
pull Heien over, the officer’s search and the Court’s subsequent 
decision in Heien raises very serious Fourth Amendment problems. 
Amid a tense climate of racial unrest and minority suspicion of 
law enforcement following police confrontations in Ferguson162 and 
New York,163 Heien’s reasonable mistake of law doctrine will further 
erode confidence in the criminal justice system.164 According to 
Justice Sotomayor, there are “human consequences . . . including 
those for communities and for their relationships with the police.”165 
The Court’s added wrinkle in the reasonable suspicion doctrine 
broadens police discretion to allow race-based traffic stops, which 
further exacerbates the deep distrust between law enforcement and 
minorities.166 
Allowing police officers to have more leeway under the Fourth 
Amendment encourages police ignorance of the law and weakens the 
relationship between law enforcement officials and the citizens they 
are entrusted to protect. Additionally, the lack of a specific test to 
determine what reasonableness means in the context of a mistake of 
law leaves this unchartered territory to the discretion of lower courts, 
which Justice Sotomayor predicts “will prove murky in 
application.”167 The anticipated possibility of inconsistent 
applications of the mistake of law doctrine thus warrants the disposal 
of the doctrine in a Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion 
analysis. 
160. Cf. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“One wonders how a citizen
seeking to be law-abiding and to structure his or her behavior to avoid these invasive, frightening, 
and humiliating encounters could do so.”). 
161. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 2; see Lithwick, supra note 2.
162. Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under -siege-after-police-shooting.html 
(last updated Aug. 10, 2015). 
163. Aaron Blake, Why Eric Garner Is the Turning Point Ferguson Never Was, WASH. POST
(Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/12/08/why-eric-garner-is 
-the-turning-point-ferguson-never-was/.
164. See Lithwick, supra note 2; Morris, supra note 104.
165. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
166. See Morris, supra note 104.
167. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Before the Fourth Amendment was written, Benjamin Franklin 
declared, “they who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little 
temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”168 The 
implication of his statement is that there will always be a balance 
between liberty and safety under the Fourth Amendment. However, 
the Court’s decision in Heien tears at the damaged relationship 
between law enforcement and minority communities and further 
diminishes the few Fourth Amendment protections we have left. 
Understanding this, Justice Sotomayor warned that the Court’s ruling 
in Heien “means further eroding the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
of civil liberties in a context where that protection has already been 
worn down.”169 
Rather than adding an officer’s mistake of law into the 
reasonable suspicion inquiry, the Court could have simply found that 
an officer’s mistake of law, no matter how reasonable, cannot 
establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a seizure in 
accordance with the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, because there 
is no basis in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for treating mistake 
of law the same as mistake of fact, Officer Darisse’s reasonable 
suspicion based on his mistake of North Carolina law suggests his 
subsequent search and seizure of Heien’s car was impermissible. 
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment did not protect Officer Darisse’s 
actions. 
The Court’s reliance on the reasonable mistake of law approach 
not only undermines the principles of the Fourth Amendment but 
also presents significant implications for future application. For these 
reasons, the Court should abandon the reasonable mistake of law 
doctrine in its Fourth Amendment analysis.  
168. 1 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN & WILLIAM TEMPLETON FRANKLIN, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE AND
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, LL.D. 270 (London, Henry Colburn 1818). 
169. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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